| 000 | 01931nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20241128081954.0 | ||
| 008 | 241128b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a03128962 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHD31 AUS |
| 100 | 1 |
_aKhan, Arifur _eauthor |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aManagerial share ownership and operating performance : _bdo independent and executive directors have different incentives?/ _ccreated by Arifur Khan, Paul Mather and Balasingham Balachandran |
| 264 | 1 |
_aLos Angeles : _bSage, _c2014. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
||
| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
||
| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aAustralian journal of management _vVolume 39, number 1 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aWe investigate the relationship between managerial share ownership (MSO) and earnings as a measure of operating performance in Australia. To mitigate potential earnings management, we also use discretionary accrual adjusted earnings as an alternative measure of performance. We document a negative relation between MSO and performance followed by a positive relation. We suggest that these unique results are an artefact of certain Australian institutional features and imply that the ownership–performance relation is context-specific, with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorised incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership–performance incentives. Our results are consistent with this proposition and suggest that independent directors may be immune to the theorised incentive alignment or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership. | |
| 650 |
_aEntrenchment _vIncentive alignment _xManagerial share ownership |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aMather, Paul _eco author |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aBalachandran, Balasingham _eco author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0312896212463152 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
||
| 999 |
_c168435 _d168435 |
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