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008 | 241128b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a0312-8962 | ||
040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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050 | 0 | 0 | _aHD31 AUS |
100 | 1 |
_aClinch, Greg _eauthor |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aDisclosure quality, diversification and the cost of capital _ccreated by Greg Clinch |
264 | 1 |
_aLos Angeles: _bSage, _c2013. |
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336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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440 |
_aAustralian journal of management _vVolume 38, number 3. |
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520 | 3 | _aBased on a stylized infinite-period and multi-asset model of a securities market, I discuss several aspects of the link between disclosure quality and cost of capital, with a particular focus on how diversification influences this link. I first show that because investors have finite horizons and thus face price risk, disclosure plays a role in determining ex ante cost of capital in such a setting, contrary to the result of Christensen et al. ((2010) Information and the cost of capital: An ex ante perspective. Accounting Review 83: 817–848). With respect to diversification, I highlight the role of three aspects of a ‘large economy’ that influence how disclosure quality affects cost of capital: (1) the number of firms across which risk is distributed; (2) the number of investors among whom this risk is shared; and (3) the number of information signals (disclosures) available to investors from which to extract information. Finally, I extend the model to include the effects of non-rational traders who follow a simple trading heuristic and show that this results in an additional disclosure-contingent factor in equilibrium price that does not diversify away under fairly general conditions. | |
650 |
_aCost of capital _vDisclosure quality _xDiversification |
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856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0312896213510700 | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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_c168434 _d168434 |