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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20241127092807.0
008			241127b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0312-8962
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD31 AUS
100	1		_aLepone, Andrew _eauthor
245	1	0	_aUnequal access to analyst research _ccreated by Andrew Lepone, Henry Leung, and J George Li
264	1		_aLos Angeles: _bSage, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aAustralian journal of management _vVolume 38, number 2
520	3		_aThis study examines the relationship between equity analysts and information asymmetry, and the extent of leakages in analyst recommendations. Literature suggests that analysts reduce information asymmetry by bringing privately held information to the market, and through superior analysis of publicly available information. However, we find that investor access to analyst reports is far from even, and show evidence consistent with the leakage of analyst recommendations. We find that leakages provide annualised cumulative abnormal returns of approximately 6.30% for upgrades and 12.53% for downgrades over a four-week period, after a generous provision of 1% (round trip) for transaction costs. In our examination of broker/analyst size, we find evidence of greater leakage from the smaller brokers on stock downgrades, but not upgrades. We suggest that smaller brokers are less likely to have an established relationship with company management, are less reliant on them as a source of future information, and are therefore less hesitant to leak downgrades.
650			_aEquity analysts _vInformation asymmetry _xInformation leakage
700	1		_aLeung, Henry _eco-author
700	1		_aLi, J George _eco-author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0312896212446997
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c168409 _d168409