000			02143nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240829105355.0
008			240829b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a13853457
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD31 JOU
100	1		_aSeidl, David _eauthor
245	1	0	_aApplying the 'comply-or-explain' principle: _bDiscursive legitimacy tactics with regard to codes of corporate governance _ccreated by David Seidl Paul Sanderson and John Roberts
264	1		_aDordrecht: _bSpringer, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of management and governance _vVolume 17, number 3
520	3		_aThe comply-or-explain principle is a central element of most codes of corporate governance. Originally put forward by the Cadbury Committee in the UK as a practical means of establishing a code of corporate governance whilst avoiding an inflexible “one size fits all” approach, it has since been incorporated into code regimes around the world. Companies can either comply with code provisions or may explain why they do not comply, i.e., why they deviate from a code provision. Despite its wide application very little is known about the ways in which comply-or-explain is used. In addressing this we employ legitimacy theory by which explanations for deviating can be understood as means of legitimizing the company’s actions. We analyzed the compliance statements and reports of 257 listed companies in the UK and Germany, producing some 715 records of deviation. From this we generated an empirically derived taxonomy of the explanations. In a second order analysis we examine the underlying logic and identify various legitimacy tactics. We discuss the consequences of these legitimacy tactics for code regimes and the implications for policy makers.
650			_aComply-or-explain principle _vDiscursive legitimacy tactics _xCorporate governance
700			_aSanderson, Paul _eco-author
700			_aRoberts, John _eco-author
856			_uDOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9209-y
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c166952 _d166952