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022 _a00014788
040 _aMSU
_bEnglish
_cMSU
_erda
050 0 0 _aHD30.4 ACC
100 1 _aO'Hanlon, John
_eauthor
245 1 0 _aDid loan-loss provisioning by UK banks become less timely after implementation of IAS 39?
_ccreated by John O'Hanlon
264 1 _aAbingdon:
_bRoutledge:
_c2013
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _aAccounting and business research
_vVolume 43, number 3
520 3 _aFollowing the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, accounting regulators sought to replace the incurred-loss method of loan-loss provisioning by a more forward-looking expected-loss method. Difficulties arose, including with respect to the weight that expected-loss provisioning should place on objective evidence of loss relative to evidence of a less specific and more judgemental nature. This paper provides evidence relevant to this issue by examining whether loan-loss provisioning by UK banks was less timely under the stricter evidence requirements of the IAS 39 incurred-loss regime implemented in 2005 than under the less strict evidence requirements of the previous UK incurred-loss regime. It does so by reference to the relationship in time between loan write-offs and loan-loss expense. The results do not suggest that provisioning became less timely under the stricter evidence requirements of IAS 39. There is no evidence that provisioning became less timely immediately prior to the crisis of the late 2000s. Also, there is no evidence that general provisioning, permitted under the pre-IAS 39 regime, enhanced the timeliness of loan-loss provisioning. The results do not suggest that stricter requirements regarding the evidence necessary to support recognition of loan losses have resulted in less timely loan-loss provisioning.
650 _aLoan-loss provisioning
_vUK banks
_xImplementation of IAS 39.
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2013.747260
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c166834
_d166834