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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240820105123.0
008			240820b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00014788
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD30.4 ACC
100	1		_aSundgren, Stefan _eauthor
245	1	0	_aAudit office size, audit quality and audit pricing: _bevidence from small- and medium-sized enterprises _ccreated by Stefan Sundgren and Tobias Svanström
264	1		_aAbingdon: _bRoutledge, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aAccounting and Business Research _vVolume 43, number 1
520	3		_aUsing Swedish data, we investigate how audit quality and audit pricing vary with audit firm and office size. In contrast to prior studies, we use disciplinary sanctions issued against auditors not meeting the quality requirement as the measure of audit quality. We find no significant differences in the likelihood of sanctions between Big 4 audit firms and the fifth and sixth largest audit firms in Sweden (Grant Thornton and BDO). We refer to these collectively as ‘Top 6’. However, we find that the probabilities of warnings or exclusions from the profession are much higher for non-Top 6 auditors in Sweden than for Top 6 auditors. Furthermore, we find a strong negative association between the likelihood of sanctions and audit office size for non-Top 6 auditors. This association is insignificant for Top 6 audit firms. Audit fees follow a similar pattern and indicate that larger audit firms and offices put in more effort or have greater expertise. These results suggest that audit quality is differentiated in the private segment market. However, contrary to prior studies, our results suggest that the important dimensions are Top 6 versus non-Top 6 and the office size of non-Top 6 audit firms.
650			_aDisciplinary sanctions _vAudit pricing _xMedium-sized enterprises
700	1		_aSvanström, Tobias _eco-author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2012.691710
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c166829 _d166829