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008			240820b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00014788
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD30.4 ACC
100	1		_aLi, Yong _eauthor
245	1	0	_aDeterminants of expected rate of return on pension assets: _bevidence from the UK _ccreated by Yong Li and Paul Klumpes
264	1		_aAbingdon: _bRoutledge, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aAccounting and business research _vVolume 43, number 1
520	3		_aThis study explores whether UK managers behaved opportunistically when determining the expected rate of return on pension assets (ERRs) during an extended period of major changes in pension accounting rules (1998–2002), and whether this behaviour changed with the transitional adoption of FRS 17. The empirical results support the contracting hypothesis that UK firms with tightening debt covenants inflated their reported ERRs over this period. The contracting cost incentive underlying reported ERRs appears to be stronger during the FRS 17 transitional adoption period, and ERRs were used jointly with salary growth rate to manage balance sheet leverage. One important implication of our findings is that the IASB's 2011 revision to IAS 19, Employee Benefits, which removed the flexibility that firms could exercise in selection of ERR assumptions, potentially improves the reliability of reported pension cost components.
650			_aPension fund _vCapital income _xAccounting policy _zUnited Kingdom
700	1		_aKlumpes, Paul J. M _eco-author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2012.685286
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c166825 _d166825