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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240819140811.0
008			240819b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00014788
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD30.4 ACC
100	1		_aPeel, Michael J. _eauthor
245	1	4	_aThe pricing of initial audit engagements by big 4 and leading mid-tier auditors _ccreated by Michael J. Peel
264	1		_aAbingdon: _bRoutledge, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aAccounting and business research _vVolume 43, number 6
520	3		_aThe recent investigation of the UK audit market by the Competition Commission testifies to perennial regulatory concerns regarding increasing supplier concentration, big 4 dominance of large company audits and the capacity of mid-tier auditors to compete. Against this backdrop, this paper presents new evidence on whether there is competitive pricing for initial audit engagements by big 4 auditors relative to their next four largest mid-tier (mid 4) counterparts for the UK quoted and private corporate sectors. Based on data from FAME for 2007 and 2010, the evidence indicates that larger quoted companies switching between the big 4 benefit from substantial discounts, with smaller discounts attracted by clients switching to the mid 4. Coupled with evidence that fees for both audit and non-audit services recover in subsequent periods, and consistent with the theoretical framework, the paper concludes that big 4 discounting is a competitive outcome aimed at securing future economic rents. New evidence demonstrates that smaller clients switching to big 4 or mid 4 auditors do not benefit from low-balling.
650			_aAudit competition _vPrice recovery _xService quality
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2013.827106
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c166785 _d166785