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005 | 20240725081043.0 | ||
008 | 240725b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a09596801 | ||
040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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050 | 0 | 0 | _aHD8371 EUR |
100 | 1 |
_aYerkes, Mara _eauthor |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aSocial risk protection in collective agreements: _bEvidence from the Netherlands _ccreated by Mara Yerkes and Kea Tijdens |
264 | 1 |
_aLondon: _bsage, _c2010 |
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336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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440 |
_aEuropean journal of industrial relations _vVolume 16, number 4 |
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520 | 3 | _aTo what extent can collective bargaining compensate for a decline in or absence of welfare state protection against social risks? In this article, we use a comprehensive collective agreement database to analyse social risk coverage in the Netherlands from 1995 to 2009. We compare two forms of social risk, disability and workâlife arrangements, analysing the share of collective agreements that offer these arrangements across time. Our results show that collective bargaining differs across the public and private sector but is similar at different levels of bargaining. In general, our findings demonstrate that collective agreements often compensate for declining welfare state coverage or a lack of state provision. As a result, the findings presented here suggest occupational welfare, in the form of collective bargaining, is an important component of welfare provision that is oftentimes overlooked in the current welfare state literature | |
650 |
_aSocial risk protection _vCollective agreements _xEvidence from the Netherlands _zNetherlands |
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700 | 1 |
_aTijdens, Kea _eauthor |
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856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0959680110384608 | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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_c166196 _d166196 |