000 01845nam a22002537a 4500
003 ZW-GwMSU
005 20240725081043.0
008 240725b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022 _a09596801
040 _aMSU
_bEnglish
_cMSU
_erda
050 0 0 _aHD8371 EUR
100 1 _aYerkes, Mara
_eauthor
245 1 0 _aSocial risk protection in collective agreements:
_bEvidence from the Netherlands
_ccreated by Mara Yerkes and Kea Tijdens
264 1 _aLondon:
_bsage,
_c2010
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _aEuropean journal of industrial relations
_vVolume 16, number 4
520 3 _aTo what extent can collective bargaining compensate for a decline in or absence of welfare state protection against social risks? In this article, we use a comprehensive collective agreement database to analyse social risk coverage in the Netherlands from 1995 to 2009. We compare two forms of social risk, disability and work—life arrangements, analysing the share of collective agreements that offer these arrangements across time. Our results show that collective bargaining differs across the public and private sector but is similar at different levels of bargaining. In general, our findings demonstrate that collective agreements often compensate for declining welfare state coverage or a lack of state provision. As a result, the findings presented here suggest occupational welfare, in the form of collective bargaining, is an important component of welfare provision that is oftentimes overlooked in the current welfare state literature
650 _aSocial risk protection
_vCollective agreements
_xEvidence from the Netherlands
_zNetherlands
700 1 _aTijdens, Kea
_eauthor
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0959680110384608
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c166196
_d166196