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008			240606b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a16102878
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHF1351 REV
100	1		_aMoore, Michael _eauthor
245	1	0	_aWhy don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations?: _bAn empirical analysis _ccreated by Michael O. Moore and Alan K. Fox
264	1		_aLondon: _bSage, _c2010
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aReview of World Economics _vVolume 145, number 1
520	3		_aForeign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.
650			_aAntidumping _vFacts-available _xUS trade policy _zUnited States
700			_aFox, Alan _eco-author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-009-0035-0
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c165967 _d165967