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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240523b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00014273
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD28 ACA
100	1		_aBertrand, Olivier _eauthor
245	1	0	_aPartners in crime: _bthe effects of diversity on the longevity of cartels _ccreated by Olivier Bertrand and Fabrice Lumineau
264	1		_aNw York: _bAcademy of Management, _c2016
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aAcademy of management journal _vVolume 59, number 3
520	3		_aDespite the importance of organizational misconduct, still not much is known about coordinated misconduct between firms. In this study, we seek a better understanding of how the profile of the partners involved in cartels affects the longevity of their joint misconduct activities. Drawing upon diversity theory, we leverage a distinction between three types of diversity—variety of age-based experience, separation in uncertainty avoidance, and power disparity—in collective organizational misconduct between firms, and study their respective influence on the longevity of cartels. Our empirical analysis gives support to our main arguments: the longevity of cartels tends to be increased by the level of variety of age-based experience and power disparity between partners but reduced by their level of separation in uncertainty avoidance. Implications for the literature on organizational misconduct are discussed.
650			_aCartel _vDuration _xEconomic crime _zEU countries
700	1		_aLumineau, Fabrice _eco-author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2013.1209
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c165619 _d165619