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022 _a0143831X
040 _aMSU
_bEnglish
_cMSU
_erda
050 0 0 _aHD5650 EID
100 1 _aPark, Sung Ho
_eauthor
245 1 0 _aCapital openness, monetary integration, and wage-setting coordination in developed European countries/
_ccreated by Sung Ho Park
264 1 _aLos Angeles:
_bSage,
_c2013.
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _aEconomic and industrial democracy
_vVolume 34, number 4
520 3 _aHow capital openness influences the wage-setting process is a topic that has been discussed extensively in the literature on European industrial relations. One well-known hypothesis asserts that high capital openness induces employers to de-coordinate the wage-setting process, if wage costs have been under poor control. This article provides a critical review of the hypothesis, arguing that it holds only if governments can provide flexible accommodating policies for employers during the period of institutional transition. If such policy options are not available, which is true when governments are committed to European monetary integration, the hypothesis does not hold. This claim is tested with a Boolean qualitative analysis of 11 European countries, focusing on the periods from the 1970s to early 2000s.
650 _aCapital openness
_vIndustrial relations
_xWage-setting coordination
_zEU countries
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X12452944
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c165494
_d165494