000			01674nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240518075442.0
008			240518b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0143831X
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHD5650 EID
100	1		_aPark, Sung Ho _eauthor
245	1	0	_aCapital openness, monetary integration, and wage-setting coordination in developed European countries/ _ccreated by Sung Ho Park
264	1		_aLos Angeles: _bSage, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aEconomic and industrial democracy _vVolume 34, number 4
520	3		_aHow capital openness influences the wage-setting process is a topic that has been discussed extensively in the literature on European industrial relations. One well-known hypothesis asserts that high capital openness induces employers to de-coordinate the wage-setting process, if wage costs have been under poor control. This article provides a critical review of the hypothesis, arguing that it holds only if governments can provide flexible accommodating policies for employers during the period of institutional transition. If such policy options are not available, which is true when governments are committed to European monetary integration, the hypothesis does not hold. This claim is tested with a Boolean qualitative analysis of 11 European countries, focusing on the periods from the 1970s to early 2000s.
650			_aCapital openness _vIndustrial relations _xWage-setting coordination _zEU countries
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X12452944
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c165494 _d165494