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008			240422b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09638024
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHC800.A1 JOU
100	1		_aAzam Jean-Paul _eauthor
245	1	0	_aPrivatisation versus regulation in developing economies: _bThe case of West African banks _ccreated by Jean Paul Azam, Bruno Biais and Magueye Dia
264	1		_aOxford: _bOxford University Press, _c2004
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of African Economies _vVolume 13, number 3
520	3		_aThis paper builds on the case of West African banks to propose an analysis of the issues raised by government interference, privatisation to foreign investors and regulation in developing countries. In the late 1980s, there was a severe crisis in the West African banking system, partly due to government interference. The restructuring of the banking system entailed privatisation and foreign share ownership. During the 1990s, both foreign ownership and the proportion of bad loans went down. We offer an interpretation of these stylised facts within the framework of a simple model where non-benevolent governments are prone to political interference, as long as it does not generate too large expected social costs, and learn to refrain from interference after severe crises. Privatisation to foreign investors seeking high return and high risk does not always ensure efficiency of the banking system, while regulation by independent agencies can be more effective. Further confrontation of the theory to the data is provided by panel regressions on profits, bad loans and ownership ran across the seven countries of the West African
650			_aPrivatization _vPortfolio-Investition _xBank regulation _zWest Africa
700	1		_aBiais Bruno _eco-author
700	1		_aDia Magueye _eco-author
856			_u10.1093/jae/ejh022
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164978 _d164978