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022 _a09670750
040 _aMSU
_bEnglish
_cMSU
_erda
050 0 0 _aHC244 ECO
100 1 _aDimova, Ralitza
_eauthor
245 1 0 _aMonopolistic wages or efficient contracts?:
_bwhat determined the wage–employment bargain in post-privatization Bulgaria/
_ccreated by Ralitza Dimova
264 1 _aOxford:
_bBlackwell Publishing,
_c2006.
336 _2rdacontent
_atext
_btxt
337 _2rdamedia
_aunmediated
_bn
338 _2rdacarrier
_avolume
_bnc
440 _aEconomics of transition
_vVolume 14, number 2
520 3 _aUsing a representative sample of medium and large firms, this paper explores the process of employment and wage bill determination in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector. The results suggest that, during 1997–2001, the labour market behaviour of these firms was consistent with weakly efficient contracting and employment elasticity with respect to both sales and wages similar to that of the fastest-reforming Central and Eastern Europe economies. Although a case study using data on sell-off deals by the Privatization Agency suggests that the largest firms selected for cash privatization may have exhibited higher preference for wage enhancement than employment protection, the results do not bring into question the efficient performance of the post-crisis labour market in Bulgaria. Importantly, the study rejects the hypothesis that either persistent government stakes or mass privatization may have led to efficiency deterioration.
650 _aCollective bargaining
_vManufacturing industries
_xPrivatization
_zBulgaria
856 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2006.00253.x
942 _2lcc
_cJA
999 _c164903
_d164903