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008			240415b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09318658
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB171.5 JOU
100	1		_aVetter Henrik _eauthor
245	1	0	_aConsumption taxes in monopolistic competition: _bA comment _ccreated by Henrik Vetter
264	1		_aHeidelberg: _bSpringer, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Economics _vVolume 110, number 3
520	3		_aWe show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used.
650			_aUnit taxes _vMonopolistic competition _xMark-up pricing
856			_u10.1007/s00712-012-0320-6
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164866 _d164866