000			01919nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240415095032.0
008			240415b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09318658
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB171.5 JOU
100	1		_aManduchi Agostino _eauthor
245	1	0	_aNon-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty _ccreated by Agostino Manduchi
264	1		_aHeidelberg: _bSpringer, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Economics _vVolume 109, number 1
520	3		_aThis paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.
650			_aMatch-value _vInformation provision _xMutual information and Bayesian learning
856			_u10.1007/s00712-012-0283-7
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164862 _d164862