| 000 | 01536nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240415084257.0 | ||
| 008 | 240415b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a09318658 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB171.5 JOU |
| 100 | 1 |
_aLi Sanxi _eauthor |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aAssortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk _ccreated by Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun and Pu Chen |
| 264 | 1 |
_aHeidelberg: _bSpringer, _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
||
| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Economics _vVolume 109, number 1 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aA standard risk-sharing matching game predicts negative assortative matching over agents’ risk attitudes. In regards to risk sharing, less risk-averse agents prefer highly risk-averse partners, who pay a high risk premium. Negative sorting is, however, inconsistent with empirical and experimental literature. To resolve this conflict, we propose a model where agents can control the risks to their incomes. In regards to risk management, agents prefer similar partners because of their aligned objectives in risk management. When it is easy to control risks or all agents are sufficiently risk-averse, the risk-management effect dominates, leading to positive sorting. | |
| 650 |
_aAssortative matching _vEfficient risk sharing _xEndogenous risk |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aHailin Sun _eco-author |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_aPu Chen _eco-author |
|
| 856 | _u10.1007/s00712-012-0323-3 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
||
| 999 |
_c164860 _d164860 |
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