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003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
005 | 20240411111338.0 | ||
008 | 240411b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a09318658 | ||
040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB171.5 JOU |
100 | 1 |
_aRomero, J. Gabriel _eauthor |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aWhat circumstances lead a government to promote brain drain? _ccreated by José Gabriel Romero |
264 | 1 |
_aHeidelberg: _bSpringer, _c2013 |
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336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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440 |
_aJournal of Economics _vVolume 108, number 2 |
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520 | 3 | _aThis paper aims to complement the existing theoretical brain drain literature, focusing on the interaction between education, skilled emigration and government intervention in a small open economy. This article first characterises different emigration patterns that may arise in equilibrium, then seeks the conditions that lead a government to promote brain-drain. The model shows that the government may promote skilled emigration among workers with intermediate skills even though the resulting brain drain decreases per capita income. Emigrants remittances outweigh the income they would produce if they did not emigrate. Therefore, the government makes less severe the fall in per capita income that follows the brain drain by encouraging emigration among those skilled workers who are more productive abroad. | |
650 |
_aAssimilation process _vBrain drain _xMigration pattern |
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856 | _u10.1007/s00712-012-0272-x | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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999 |
_c164825 _d164825 |