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005 | 20240412084930.0 | ||
008 | 240411b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a08503907 | ||
040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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050 | 0 | 0 | _aHC501 AFR |
100 | 1 |
_aIfidon, Ehimika A. _eauthor |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aSocial rationality and class analysis on national conflict in Nigeria: _ba historiographical critique/ _ccreated by Ehimika A. Ifidon |
264 | 1 |
_aDakar: _bCODESRIA, _c1999. |
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336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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440 |
_aAfrica development _vVolume 24, number 1/2 |
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520 | 3 | _aPolitical instability in Nigeria cannot be attributed to mass poverty or the failure of growth, even though the Nigerian economy is largely based on a single export product, crude oil. The breakdown of Nigeria's civil regimes has resulted in national conflicts which have nearly undermined the integrity of the State. These conflicts, ranging from the 1953 crisis over the 'self-government in 1956' motion to the 1993-1994 crisis following the annulment of the 1993 elections, have often been explained in terms of the sectional configuration of Nigeria. The present article examines the validity of these explanations. It criticizes theoretical class analysis as it is applied to the Nigerian situation, arguing that class crystallization is dysfunctional in a nonrational and culturally plural system. In other words, social class distinctions do not effectively transcend ethnic barriers. National conflict in Nigeria can be better explained in terms of the ethno-regional struggle for the control of the State. | |
650 |
_aNational conflict _vEthnicity _xClass analysis _zNigeria |
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856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.4314/ad.v24i1.22120 | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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999 |
_c164799 _d164799 |