000			01660nam a22002417a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240410132427.0
008			240410b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09318658
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB171.5 JOU
100	1		_aHeijnen, Pim _eauthor
245	1	0	_aInformative advertising by an environmental group _ccreated by Pim Heijnen
264	1		_aHeidelberg: _bSpringer, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Economics _vVolume 108, number 3
520	3		_aConsuming a product does not (necessarily) reveal the environmental damage it may cause. In terms of environmental damage, most goods are credence goods. Therefore, advertising and pricing rarely can transmit such information effectively to consumers. This article considers the scope with which an environmental group (EG) can signal this information to consumers via advertising and campaigning. Although an EG can inform the public, the welfare effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the EG may not have an incentive to acquire information about the firm’s production practices. However, when the firm chooses the level of environmental damage and the EG chooses whether to acquire information, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium for some parameter values, such that the EG acquires information, and the threat of advertising causes the firm to produce an environmentally friendly good.
650			_aEnvironmental group _vEnvironmental quality _xInformative advertising
856			_u10.1007/s00712-012-0284-6
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164789 _d164789