000			01982nam a22002537a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240408132847.0
008			240408b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a10704965
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHC79 JOU
100	1		_aPellegrini Lorenzo _eauthor
245	1	0	_aCorruption, democracy, and environmental policy: _bAn empirical contribution to the debate _ccreated by Lorenzo Pellegrini and Reyer Gerlagh
264	1		_aThousand Oaks: _bSAGE, _c2006
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe journal of environment & development _vVolume 15, number 3
520	3		_aTheoretical and empirical studies have shown that democracy and corruption influence environmental policies. In this article, the authors empirically analyze the relative importance of these determinants of environmental policy. When these variables are jointly included as explanatory variables in a multiple regression analysis, the authors found that corruption stands out as a substantial and significant determinant of environmental policies, while proxies for democracy have an insignificant impact. Nevertheless, democracy could affect environmental policy stringency given that countries with a history of democratic rule tend to be less corrupted. The authors argue that improving environmental quality following increasing income is less probable in developing countries with institutional disarray. Finally, and more optimistically, when considering the results in the context of institutions and growth, the authors conclude that there is scope for reaping a double dividend, when institutional improvements and reductions in corruption induce higher economic growth rates and stricter environmental policies.
650			_aCorruption _vDemocracy _xDevelopment
700	1		_aGerlagh, Reyer _eco-author
856			_u10.1177/1070496506290960
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164713 _d164713