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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240403065449.0 | ||
| 008 | 240403b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a09382259 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB119 ECO |
| 100 | 1 |
_aHu, Tai-Wei _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aExpected utility theory from the frequentist perspective _ccreated by Tai-Wei Hu |
| 264 | 1 |
_aBerlin: _bSpringer, _c2013 |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aEconomic theory _vVolume 53, number 1 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aWe present an axiomatization of expected utility from the frequentist perspective. It starts with a preference relation on the set of infinite sequences with limit relative frequencies. We consider three axioms parallel to the ones for the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vN–M) expected utility theory. Limit relative frequencies correspond to probability values in lotteries in the vN–M theory. This correspondence is used to show that each of our axioms is equivalent to the corresponding vN–M axiom in the sense that the former is an exact translation of the latter. As a result, a representation theorem is established: The preference relation is represented by an average of utilities with weights given by the relative frequencies. | |
| 650 |
_aObjective probability _vExpected utility theory _xFrequentist theory of probability |
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| 650 | _aDecision theory | ||
| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0482-9 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c164617 _d164617 |
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