000			01525nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240402125548.0
008			240402b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09382259
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB119 ECO
100	1		_aMoreno, Diego _eauthor
245	1	0	_aStrategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods _ccreated by Diego Moreno and María José Moscoso
264	1		_aBerlini: _bSpringer, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aEconomic theory _vVolume 52, number 1
520	3		_aWe show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
650			_aAllocation mechanisms _vPublic goods _xStrategy-proofness
650			_aDictatorship _xEfficiency
700	1		_aMoscoso, María José _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164608 _d164608