000			01829nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240404074320.0
008			240326b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a09382259
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB119 ECO
100	1		_aDickson, Alex _eauthor
245	1	0	_aBilateral oligopoly and quantity competition _cby Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley
264	1		_aBerlin: _bSpringer, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aEconomic theory _vVolume 52, number 3
520	3		_aBilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, bilateral oligopoly approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one and investigate the differences in equilibria otherwise. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.
650			_aQuantity competition _vCournot _xStrategic foundation
650			_aCommitment
700	1		_aHartley, Roger _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0676-9
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164547 _d164547