| 000 | 01657nam a22002537a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240319141952.0 | ||
| 008 | 240319b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a0938-2259 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
||
| 050 | _aHB119 ECO | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aHu, Xiaojuan _eauthor |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aInformation acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets _cby Xiaojuan Hu & Cheng-Zhong Qin |
| 264 | 1 |
_aHeildelberg : _bSpringer, _c2013 |
|
| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
||
| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
||
| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
||
| 440 |
_aEconomic theory _vVolume 54, number 1 |
||
| 520 | _aWe analyze welfare effect of information acquisition for a model of competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. We show that in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, each agent’s gain from trade in ex ante utility decreases as more agents become informed. An implication of the result is that market efficiency and ex ante Pareto optimality are not compatible in competitive financial markets with diverse information and rational expectations. Our result can be viewed as complementary to the Grossman paradox, which shows that market efficiency and individuals’ incentives to acquire information are not compatible. This paper is the first step in a projected exploration of welfare effect of information acquisition in models with diverse information. | ||
| 650 |
_aInformation acquisition _vWelfare effect _xFinancial markets |
||
| 700 |
_aQin, Cheng-Zhong _eco-author |
||
| 856 | _u10.1007/s00199-012-0711-5 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
||
| 999 |
_c164458 _d164458 |
||