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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aBen Basaṭ, Avi _eauthor
245	1	0	_aConflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms _ccreated by Avi Ben-Bassat
264	1		_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 4, part 1
520	3		_aThe present study is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms: politicians, regulators, and interest groups. Special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators. Professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform, thereby weakening their confidence in it. Conflicts also benefit interest groups, increasing their effectiveness vis-à-vis politicians. Using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform Israel’s financial market, I find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups, the lower the probability that a reform will be approved. These conflicts, together with the strength of interest groups, have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms, so that it takes, on average, 10 years for a reform to be adopted
650			_aBanking reforms _vEconomic reform _xFinancial markets
650			_aGovernment intervention _vGovernment reform _xMacroeconomic reform
650			_aPolitical interest groups _vPolitical reform _xPoliticians
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/658672
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164416 _d164416