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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB119 ECO
100	1		_aPostl, Peter _eauthor
245	1	0	_aEfficiency versus optimality in procurement _cby Peter Postl
264	1		_aHeildelberg : _bSpringer, _c2013
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aEconomic Theory _vVolume 53, number 2
520			_aWe study procurement procedures that simultaneously determine the specification and price of a good. Suppliers can offer and produce the good in either of two possible specifications, both of which are equally good for the buyer. Production costs are interdependent and unknown at the time of bidding. Each supplier receives two signals about production cost, one per specification. Our model is a special case of the interdependent value settings with multidimensional types in Jehiel and Moldovanu (Econometrica 69:1237-1259, 2001) where an efficient and incentive compatible mechanism exists. We characterize equilibrium bidding behavior if the winning supplier is selected purely on the basis of price, regardless of the specification offered. While there is a positive chance of obtaining an inefficient specification, this procurement mechanism involves lower information rents than efficient mechanisms, suggesting that there is a trade-off between minimizing expected expenditure for the good, and ensuring that the efficient specification is chosen
650			_aBusiness and Economics _vEconomic Theory _xProcurement
856			_u10.1007/s00199-012-0699-x
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164415 _d164415