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008			240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aSchneider, Henry _eauthor
245	1	0	_aMoral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: _bevidence from the New York City Taxi Industry _ccreated by Henry Schneider
264	1		_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 4
520	3		_aIn this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning
650			_aAccident rates _vAccidents _xAutomobile accidents
650			_aEstimated taxes _vLeases _xMoral hazard
650			_aTaxi drivers _vTraffic violations _xVehicle operation
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/652423
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164396 _d164396