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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240318b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aCookson, J. Anthony _eauthor
245	1	0	_aInstitutions and Casinos on American Indian Reservations: _ban Empirical Analysis of the Location of Indian Casinos _ccreated by J. Anthony Cookson
264	1		_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 4
520	3		_aThis paper empirically investigates the institutional determinants of whether a tribal government invests in a casino. I find that the presence of Indian casinos is strongly related to plausibly exogenous variation in reservations’ legal and political institutions. Tribal governments that can negotiate gaming compacts with multiple state governments, because tribal lands span state borders, had more than twice the estimated probability (.77 versus .32) of operating an Indian casino in 1999. Tribal governments of reservations where contracts are adjudicated in state courts, rather than tribal courts, have more than twice the estimated probability (.76 versus .34) of investing in an Indian casino, ceteris paribus. These findings suggest that states’ political pressures and predictable judiciaries affect incentives to invest in casinos. This study contributes, more generally, to the empirical literature on the effects of institutions by providing new evidence that low-cost contracting is important for taking advantage of substantial investment opportunities
650			_aCasinos _vEconomic investment _xGambling
650			_aJurisdiction _vNative Americans _xPublic investments
650			_aState courts _vState government _xTreaty lands
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/649030
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164385 _d164385