000			01830nam a22002777a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240318134744.0
008			240316b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aCain, Matthew D. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aInformation production by investment banks: _bevidence from fairness opinions _ccreated by Matthew D. Cain and David J. Denis
264	1		_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2013.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 56, number 1
520	3		_aWe analyze a direct product of the investment banking process: target firm valuations disclosed in the fairness opinions of negotiated mergers. On average, acquirer advisers exhibit positive valuation errors that are significantly greater than those of target advisers. Top-tier advisers produce more accurate valuations than lower tier advisers, but we find no relation between valuation accuracy and the contingency structure of advisory fees. The stock price reactions to merger announcements and to the public disclosure of target-sought fairness opinions are positively related to the difference between target firm valuations contained in the fairness opinion and the merger offer price. We conclude that investment banks produce information not previously available to market participants through the rendering of target-side fairness opinions
650			_aFairness _vFees _xInvestment banking
650			_aMailings _vMarket value _xProxy reporting
650			_aProxy statements _vShareholders _xStatistical median
700	1		_aDenis, David J. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/666877
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164374 _d164374