| 000 | 01551nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240318133129.0 | ||
| 008 | 240315b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB73 JOU |
| 100 | 1 |
_aWhalley, Alexander _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aElected versus appointed policy makers: _bevidence from city treasurers _ccreated by Alexander Whalley |
| 264 | 1 |
_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2013. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 56, number 1 |
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| 520 | 3 | _aThis paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19-31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas | |
| 650 |
_aCities _vCity politics _xCost efficiency |
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| 650 |
_aDebt management _vFiscal policy _xMunicipal governments |
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| 650 |
_aPolitical institutions _vPoliticians _xReferendums |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/668696 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c164368 _d164368 |
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