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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aRizzolli, Matteo _eauthor
245	1	0	_aJudicial errors and crime deterrence : _btheory and experimental evidence/ _ccreated by Rizzolli and Luca Stanca
264	1		_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2012.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 55, number 2
520	3		_aThe economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent individual (type I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss aversion, or type I error aversion, type I errors have a stronger effect on deterrence than type II errors. We test these predictions with two experimental studies in which participants choose whether to steal from other individuals, under alternative combinations of probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of errors have a significant impact on deterrence. As predicted, type I errors have a stronger impact on deterrence than type II errors. This asymmetry is entirely explained by differences in the expected utility gains from crime, whereas nonexpected utility factors do not play a significant role.
650			_aBehavior deterrence _vCriminals _xEndowments
650			_aExpected utility _vExperiment design _xFalse negative errors
650			_aLarceny _vLoss aversion _xStatistical significance
700	1		_aStanca, Luca _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/663346
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164349 _d164349