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005 | 20240318081835.0 | ||
008 | 240314b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a00222186 | ||
040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB73 JOU |
100 | 1 |
_aBuonanno, Paolo _eauthor |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aDoes social capital reduce crime? _ccreated by Paolo Buonanno, Daniel Montolio and Paolo Vanin |
264 | 1 |
_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2009. |
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336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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440 |
_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 1 |
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520 | _aWe investigate the effects of civic norms and associational networks on crime rates. Civic norms may attach guilt and shame to criminal behavior, thus increasing its opportunity cost. Associational networks may increase returns to noncriminal activities and raise detection probabilities, but they may also work as communication channels for criminals and may offer official cover to criminal activities. The empirical assessment of these effects poses serious problems of endogeneity, omitted variables, measurement error, and spatial correlation. Italy’s great variance in social and economic characteristics, its homogeneity in policies and institutions, and the availability of historical data on social capital in its regions allow us to minimize the first two problems. To tackle the last two problems, we use report‐rate‐adjusted crime rates and estimate a spatial lag model. We find that both civic norms and associational networks have a negative and significant effect on property crimes across Italian provinces | ||
650 |
_aAutomobile theft _vBlood donation _xCrime |
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650 |
_aCrime rates _vCriminals _xLarceny |
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650 |
_aProperty crimes _vReferendums _xSocial capital |
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700 | 1 |
_aMontolio, Daniel _eco author |
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700 | 1 |
_aVanin, Paolo _eco author |
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856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/595698 | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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999 |
_c164336 _d164336 |