| 000 | 01671nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240318080842.0 | ||
| 008 | 240314b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
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_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB73 JOU |
| 100 | 1 |
_aImai, Masami _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPolitical determinants of government loans in Japan/ _ccreated by Masami Imai |
| 264 |
_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2009. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 1 |
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| 520 | _aThis paper examines the political determinants of government banks’ lending decisions using prefecture‐level panel data on Japan’s government loans from 1975 to 1992. It finds that the size of government loans is positively correlated with two political factors: (1) the electoral vulnerability of politicians who belong to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and (2) their seniority. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of prefecture fixed effects, year fixed effects, and other socioeconomic factors and, more important, are present only in government loans, and not in private loans. These results suggest that self‐interested LDP members (ab)used government loans for political purposes as implied by the “political view” of government banks | ||
| 650 |
_aBank loans _vBanks _xCoefficients |
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| 650 |
_aGovernment loans _vLoans _xPolitical elections |
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| 650 |
_aPoliticians _vPrefectures _xPrivate banks |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/595697 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c164323 _d164323 |
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