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003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240313b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aPhilipson, Tomas J. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aAntitrust in the not‐for‐profit sector/ _ccreated by Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner
264			_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 1
520			_aAlthough the not‐for‐profit sector contributes greatly to aggregate output in many industries, there has been little explicit analysis of the economic consequences of applying antitrust policy in this sector. Despite the differences between for‐profit and nonprofit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that, under plausible assumptions and with possible exceptions, the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the nonprofit sector as in the for‐profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, even when they would price below cost in the absence of competition. In fact, the efficiency gains from antitrust policy may often be larger for nonprofit firms. Therefore, a policy of promoting competition has social value even when producers’ motivations are altruistic. The argument for uniform antitrust treatment of the two sectors extends to exemptions from antitrust law as well
650			_aAltruism _vAntitrust _xCost efficiency
650			_aEconomic competition _vIndustrial market _xIndustrial output
650			_aMarginal costs _vMarket power _xMarket prices
700	1		_aPosner, Richard A. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/589704
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164317 _d164317