000			01768nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240313b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aAkee, Randall _eauthor
245	1	0	_aCheckerboards and coase : _bthe effect of property institutions on efficiency in housing markets/ _ccreated by Randall Akee
264		1	_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 2
520			_aIn the late 1800s, Palm Springs, California, was evenly divided into 1‐mile‐square blocks—like a checkerboard—and property rights were assigned in alternating blocks to the Agua Caliente tribe and a non‐Indian landowner by the U.S. federal government. The quasi‐experimental nature of land assignment holds land quality constant across the two types of landowners. Sales, mortgaging, and leasing restrictions on the Agua Caliente Reservation land created large transaction costs to development on those lands; consequently, there was very little housing investment. The non‐Indian blocks, which were extensively developed, provide a benchmark for efficient outcomes for the Agua Caliente lands. Once the restrictions on Agua Caliente lands were relaxed in 1959, the number of homes and real estate values converged to t
650			_aHousing _vLand tenure _xLand trusts
650			_aLand use change _vLeases _xNative Americans
650			_aProperty trusts _vReal estate investment trusts _xReal estate taxes
856			_ug/10.1086/592718
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164315 _d164315