| 000 | 01920nam a22002657a 4500 | ||
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| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240318094053.0 | ||
| 008 | 240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB73 JOU |
| 100 | 1 |
_aSantore, Rudy _eauthor |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPatent pools as a solution to efficient licensing of complementary patents? : _bsome Experimental Evidence _ccreated by Rudy Santore, Michael McKee and David Bjornstad |
| 264 | 1 |
_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chocago Press, _c2010. |
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| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
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| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
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| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
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| 440 |
_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 1 |
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| 520 | _aProduction requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool‐like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents. | ||
| 650 |
_aPatents _xLicensing |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aMcKee, Michael _eco author |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aBjornstad, David _eco author |
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| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/600078 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
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| 999 |
_c164279 _d164279 |
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