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003			ZW-GwMSU
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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aCasas‐Arce, Pablo _eauthor
245	1	0	_aOwning versus renting : _bdo Courts Matter?/ _ccreated by Pablo Casas‐Arce and Albert Saiz
264		1	_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 1
520			_aWe develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the decision to own or lease. The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal system is inefficient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will be a shift from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agreement) toward other forms that do not (such as direct ownership). We then test this prediction and show that costly enforcement of rental contracts hampers the development of the rental housing market in a cross section of countries. We argue that this association is not the result of reverse causation from a developed rental market to more investor protective enforcement and is not driven by alternative institutional channels. The results provide supportive evidence for the importance of legal contract enforcement for market development and the optimal allocation of property rights
650			_aCities _vContract enforcement _xContracts
650			_aHousing _vInstrumental variables _xInvestors
650			_aLeases _vLegal systems _xMarket development
700	1		_aSaiz, Albert _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/649962
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164278 _d164278