| 000 | 01881nam a22002777a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ZW-GwMSU | ||
| 005 | 20240318093521.0 | ||
| 008 | 240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a00222186 | ||
| 040 |
_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda |
||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | _aHB73 JOU |
| 100 | 1 |
_aBertocchi, Graziella _eauthor |
|
| 245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe Evolution of citizenship : _beconomic and institutional determinants/ _ccreated by Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi |
| 264 | 1 |
_aChicago : _bUniversity of Chicago Press, _c2010. |
|
| 336 |
_2rdacontent _atext _btxt |
||
| 337 |
_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn |
||
| 338 |
_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc |
||
| 440 |
_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 1 |
||
| 520 | _aWe investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median‐voter model of the determination of citizenship laws. Next we test the implications of the model on a new set of data on citizenship laws across countries. We show that citizenship laws respond to economic and institutional determinants endogenously. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli regime tend to restrict their legislation, whereas countries with a jus sanguinis regime resist innovation. The welfare burden does not prove to be an obstacle to jus soli legislation, but demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, whereas instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual effect | ||
| 650 |
_aCensuses _vCitizenship _xCivil law |
||
| 650 |
_aDecolonization _vInternational borders _xInternational migration |
||
| 650 |
_aNaturalization _vPolitical migration _xStock shares |
||
| 700 | 1 |
_aStrozzi,Chiara _eco author |
|
| 856 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/600080 | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cJA |
||
| 999 |
_c164272 _d164272 |
||