000			01967nam a22002897a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aSeldeslachts, Jo _eauthor
245	1	0	_aSettle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: _bthe Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools _ccreated by Jo Seldeslachts, Joseph A. Clougherty and Pedro Pita Barros
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 3
520			_aAntitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anticompetitive behavior but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policy makers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools because they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions—blocked mergers, negotiated settlements, and monitorings—to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We use cross‐jurisdiction/pantime data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find that blocked mergers lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods and that negotiated settlements weakly increase future merger notifications; in other words, blocked mergers involve a deterrence effect, but negotiated settlements do not
650			_aAntitrust _vAntitrust policy _xBehavior deterrence
650			_aEstimation methods _vInstrumental variables estimation _xInsurance settlements
650			_aJurisdiction _vLinear regression _xStock markets
700			_aClougherty, Joseph A. _eco author
700			_aBarros, Pedro Pita _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/596038
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164264 _d164264