000			01890nam a22002657a 4500
003			ZW-GwMSU
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008			240312b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aDafny, Leemore _eauthor
245	1	0	_aEstimation and Identification of Merger Effects: _ban Application to Hospital Mergers _ccreated by Leemore Dafny
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2009.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 52, number 3
520			_aExisting empirical estimates of merger effects are compromised by the fact that merging and nonmerging entities differ in unobserved ways that independently affect outcomes of interest. To obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of consummated mergers, I propose an approach that focuses on the response of rivals to mergers and accounts for the endogeneity of exposure to these mergers. I apply this approach to evaluate the impact of independent hospital mergers in the United States between 1989 and 1996. Using the physical colocation of rivals as an instrument for whether they merge, I find a sizeable, one‐time increase in price following a rival’s merger, with the greatest increase occurring among hospitals nearest the merging hospitals. These results are more consistent with predictions from structural models of the hospital industry than with prior observational estimates of the effects of hospital mergers
650			_aConsumer prices _vHealth maintenance organizations _xHospital costs
650			_aHospital separations _vHospitals _xInstrumental variables estimation
650			_aMarket prices _vMedicare _xModeling
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/600079
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164255 _d164255