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008			240311b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050	0	0	_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aHahn, Robert W. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aThe Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance _ccreated by Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 4
520			_aAn implication of the Coase theorem is that under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is important because it means that the government can establish the overall pollution reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap and leaving it up to the legislature to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. We examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold—both in theory and in practice
650			_aChlorofluorocarbons _vCommercial regulation _xEmission allowances
650			_aEmissions reduction _vEmissions trading _xFinancial regulation
650			_aMarket power _vMarket prices _xPollutant emissions
700			_aStavins, Robert N. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/661942
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164242 _d164242