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008			240307b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100			_aToffel, Michael W. _eauthor
245			_aComing Clean and Cleaning Up: _bdoes Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing? _cby Michael W. Toffel and Jodi L. Short
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 3
520			_aRegulatory agencies are increasingly establishing voluntary self-reporting programs both as an investigative tool and to encourage regulated firms to commit to policing themselves. We investigate whether voluntary self-reporting can reliably indicate effective self-policing efforts that might provide opportunities for enforcement efficiencies. We find that regulators used self-reports of legal violations as a heuristic for identifying firms that are effectively policing their own operations, shifting enforcement resources away from those that voluntarily disclose. We also find that these firms that voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations and committed to self-policing improved their regulatory compliance and environmental performance, which suggests that the enforcement relief they received was warranted. Collectively, our results suggest that self-reporting can be a useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging the voluntary self-policing efforts of regulated companies
650			_aAuditing policies _vCommercial regulation _xEconomic regulation
650			_aEnvironmental agencies _vGovernment regulation _xIndustrial regulation
650			_aModeling _vRegulation compliance audits _xSecurities and Exchange Commission regulation
700			_aShort, Jodi L. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/658494
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164160 _d164160