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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240306140649.0
008			240306b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aFirth, Michael _eauthor
245	1	0	_aThe Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China _cby Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui and Wenfeng Wu
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 3
520			_aWe examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in China and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms. Financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns. We find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process: they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result. State-controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns. The evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process
650			_aBusiness structures _vDebt contracts _xDefendants
650			_aLawsuits _vLegal systems _xLitigation
650			_aPlaintiffs _vShareholders _xStatistical significance
700			_aRui, Oliver M. _eco author
700			_aWu, Wenfeng _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/659261
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164159 _d164159