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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aLevenstein, Margaret C. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aBreaking Up Is Hard to Do: _bdeterminants of Cartel Duration _cby Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 2
520			_aWe estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors that increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect natural death, including defection, dissension, and entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995, when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme—a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand—are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels
650			_aAmnesty _vAntitrust _xCartels
650			_aCheating _vCollusion _xEconomic fluctuations
650			_aIndustrial concentration _vIndustrial concentration ratios _xMarketing strategies
700			_aSuslow, Valerie Y. _eauthor
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/657660
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164148 _d164148