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008			240306b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aYin, Haitao _eauthor
245	1	0	_aRisk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: _bdoes the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents? _cby Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther and Matthew W. White
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 54, number 2
520			_aThis paper examines whether risk-based pricing promotes risk-reducing effort. Risk-based pricing is common in private insurance markets but rare in government assurance programs. We analyze accidental underground fuel tank leaks—a source of environmental damage to water supplies—over a 14-year period, using disaggregated (facility-level) data and policy variation in financing the cleanup of tank leaks over time. The data indicate that eliminating a state-level government assurance program and switching to private insurance markets to finance cleanups reduce the frequency of underground fuel tank leaks by more than 20 percent. This corresponds to more than 3,000 fuel tank release accidents forgone over 8 years in one state alone, a benefit in avoided cleanup costs exceeding $400 million. These benefits arise because private insurers mitigate moral hazard by providing financial incentives for tank owners to close or replace leak-prone tanks prior to costly accidents
650			_aInsurance deductibles _vInsurance policies _xInsurance premiums
650			_aInsurance providers _vInsurance regulation _xLiability insurance
700			_aKunreuther, Howard _eco author
700			_aWhite, Matthew W. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/655804
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164141 _d164141