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003			ZW-GwMSU
005			20240305124123.0
008			240305b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100			_aPecorino, Paul _eauthor
245			_aFairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game _cby Paul Pecorino and Mark Van Boening
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aThe Journal of Law and Economics _vVolume 53, number 2
520			_aWe embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer
650			_aCentral tendencies _vDefendants _xFairness
650			_aNull hypothesis _vPlaintiffs _xRisk aversion
650			_aStatistical median _vSurplus _xTrials
700			_aBoening, Mark Van _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/599622
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164110 _d164110