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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100			_aMacher, Jeffrey T. _eauthor
245			_aRegulator heterogeneity and endogenous efforts to close the information asymmetry gap _cby Jeffrey T. Macher, John W. Mayo and Jack A. Nickerson
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2011
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 54, number 1
520			_aThe now standard principal-agent model of regulator-firm interactions typically assumes the presence of a single regulator and an exogenously determined information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. In this paper we draw upon a unique data set of regulatory inspections conducted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to explore the consistency of these assumptions with the actual practice of regulators. We find that the canonical assumptions of the agency paradigm are strained by, if not altogether inconsistent with, the key practical realities of regulation by the FDA. Our analysis uncovers several dimensions along which regulators actively and endogenously seek to close the information asymmetry gap. We also find considerable regulator heterogeneity, which in turn depends in part upon the specific training and experience of individual regulators
650			_aAdministrative agencies _vAdvertising restrictions _xCommercial regulation
650			_aDrug design _vDrug regulation _xEconomic regulation
650			_aIndustrial regulation _vInformation asymmetry _xManufactured products
650			_aManufacturing processes
700			_aMayo, John W. _eco author
700			_aNickerson, Jack A. _eco author
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/658484
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164100 _d164100