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008			240305b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aMiller, Amalia R. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aDid the airline tariff publishing case reduce collusion? _cby Amalia R. Miller
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 53, number 3
520			_aIn December 1992, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against eight major domestic airlines and the Airline Tariff Publishing (ATP) Company in order to reduce opportunities for collusion in the industry. The lawsuit ended with consent decrees limiting the ability of airlines to communicate surreptitiously through the shared fare database. This paper measures the effects of the litigation and its settlement on industry performance, comparing changes in outcomes between market segments that were more and less likely to be affected by the ATP case. Prices fell in response to the investigation but increased following the settlement, while the number of tickets sold in affected markets declined. The importance of multimarket contact also declined and then recovered. The ATP case had at best a temporary effect on airline collusion
650			_aAir transportation industry _vAir travel Airlines _xAir travel Airlines _zUnited States
650			_aMarket prices _vProduct markets _xTariffs _zUnited States
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/605294
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164092 _d164092