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022			_a00222186
040			_aMSU _bEnglish _cMSU _erda
050			_aHB73 JOU
100	1		_aGrainger, Corbett A. _eauthor
245	1	0	_aRedistricting and polarization: _bwho draws the lines in California? _cby Corbett A. Grainger
264			_aChicago: _bUniversity of Chicago Press; _c2010.
336			_2rdacontent _atext _btxt
337			_2rdamedia _aunmediated _bn
338			_2rdacarrier _avolume _bnc
440			_aJournal of law and economics _vVolume 53, number 3
520			_aIn the United States, the process of drawing election districts is left to individual states, and critics of legislative redistricting often argue for independent panels to take control of the process. A common claim is that legislative redistricting has been a major contributor to polarization in the American political system. Previous attempts to test for a relationship between redistricting and polarization have generally relied on cross-state comparisons of redistricting methods and examinations of behavior in the House of Representatives. In this paper, I exploit the alternation between legislatively drawn and panel-drawn districts in California since the mid-1960s. Using data at the state legislature level, I find evidence that legislatively drawn districts have been, on average, less competitive than panel-drawn districts. Moreover, as districts become “safer,” legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions. Finally, I find evidence that legislative redistricting (compared with panel-drawn redistricting) is associated with increased polarization
650			_aElectoral districts _xGovernors _zUnited States
650			_aLabor legislation _xLegislative districts _zUnited States
650			_aPolitical parties _xRedistricting _zUnited States
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1086/605724
942			_2lcc _cJA
999			_c164090 _d164090